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“You were in jail?” 
“Only for a few days. Bribery” 
“Bribery? Who did you bribe?” 
No, the problem was I hadn’t bribed anyone. They were very upset.” 
 
Tibor Fischer, Under the Frog, cited in Leitzel (2003, p. 98).  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption can be seen as a “symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of 
the state” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p. 9). It is a phenomenon that is apparent throughout human 
history. For example, pharaohs in Ancient Egypt provided high salaries to the tax collectors 
(called scribes) to increase the opportunity costs of enriching themselves by cheating 
taxpayers (Adam 1993). The growing interest in institutional issues such as the 
transformation process of socialist economies has led to an increase in the number of studies 
devoted to exploring the causes and consequences of corruption at the international level. 
However, most of these studies explore corruption at the macro level while only a limited 
number of studies have investigated the determinants of corruption at the individual level 
(see, e.g., Mocan 2004, Swamy et al. 2001, Torgler and Valev 2006, Torgler and Dong 
2008). Research has shown that a political economic approach stressing the importance of 
institutions has proved to be a powerful tool in understanding corruption (Rose-Ackerman 
1999, Abed and Gupta 2002). Countries tend to achieve an equilibrium position that is driven 
by the balance of political forces and institutions (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 2004, 
2007). However, such studies mainly take into account the vertical interrelationship between 
citizen and the state. Our paper, on the other hand, implements a horizontal perspective using 
a behavioral economics approach hypothesizing that social interactions matter. In particular 
we stress that the own willingness be corrupt depends on the corruption level of other 
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individuals in a society and that current corruption is affected by the past corruption levels. In 
other words, we are going to explore whether conditional corruption matters and whether 
corruption is contagious. The willingness to be corrupt is influenced by the perceived 
activities of peers and other individuals. Thus, a person’s willingness to be corrupt depends 
on the pro-social behavior of other citizens. The more that others are perceived to be corrupt, 
the higher the willingness to be corrupt. The paper therefore emphasizes the relevance of 
social context in understanding corruption. Theories of contagion or pro-social behavior, 
which take the impact of behavior or the preferences of others into account, are used as a 
starting point in the theoretical approach. Contagion effects have been observed in other 
illegal activities such as assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, and serial murders as 
referred to by Bikhchandi, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998). The relevance of social interaction 
and crime is explored by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) who focus on the United 
States in their analysis both across cities and across precincts in New York. The results 
indicate that social interaction models provide a framework for understanding variances of 
cross-city crime rates. Individuals are more likely to commit crimes when those around them 
do. Frey and Torgler (2007) have found empirical evidence of conditional cooperation in the 
area of tax compliance. Kahan (1998) suggests that the decision to commit crimes is highly 
interdependent, based on the perceived behavior of others: “When they perceive that many of 
their peers are committing crimes, individuals infer that the odds of escaping punishment are 
high and the stigma of criminality is low. To the extent that many persons simultaneously 
draw these inferences and act on them, moreover, their perceptions become a self-fulfilling 
reality” (p. 394). As a consequence, individuals’ beliefs about crime is altered, suggesting 
that social influence affects criminality and the propensity to commit crimes.  
Figure 1 illustrates our argument: the higher the levels of perceived corruption in a 
society, the more citizens see it as justified. We first provide a simple theoretical explanation 
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of this observation and then check whether a more thorough study of the data supports the 
initial evidence suggested by the figure. 
 
<insert figure 1 about here> 
 
To our knowledge, our paper provides findings not yet discussed in the corruption 
literature. There are not many studies that investigate the relevance of conditional 
cooperation and a contagion effect in regards to corruption. We use the notion of “conditional 
corruption” for these effects. In particular, there is a lack of empirical evidence at the 
international level. The paper also complements a large set of laboratory experimental studies 
that have studied conditional cooperation by providing evidence outside of a lab setting. We 
will first conduct a micro analysis using data from two wide-ranging surveys, namely the 
European Values Survey and the World Values Survey. Despite the increasing interest of 
economists in the determinants of corruption, research at the micro level has not yet come 
under intense empirical investigation. The micro analysis is complemented by a macro 
analysis working with a large international data sets that covers almost 20 years. Before 
considering these findings in detail, however, Section II presents a theoretical model. Section 
III introduces the empirical part discussing the data and Section IV provides the empirical 
findings. Section V finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
In this section, we theoretically investigate conditional cooperation in a corruption 
framework. We therefore use the notion of “conditional corruption” instead of conditional 
cooperation. Individuals condition their corruption on the behaviour of other individuals. An 
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individual is prone to be corrupt if there are a sufficient number of corrupt individuals around 
him. Aidt (2003) stresses that the return to corruption perceived by an official depends on the 
number of individuals expected to be corrupt in the same organisation or society. Corruption 
is more difficult to detect in societies where corruption is more common (Lui 1986, Cadot 
1987). Moreover, individuals’ perceptions of their environment are influenced by the realities 
of the past (Sah 1988, 2005). For example, a corrupt official continues to be corrupt if she has 
interacted with a sufficient number of corrupt officials in the past. This indicates that 
corruptibility of an official seems to be stable and is often known to potential corruptors. 
Several theories have been put forward to explain what constitutes conditional 
cooperation in the area of behavioral economics. Most papers in the literature (Rabin, 1998 
and Falk and Fehr, 2002) explain conditional cooperation in terms of reciprocity. In a 
corruption context, reciprocity means, that if corruption within a society is very prevalent, 
citizens feel less guilt when engaging in extra-legal activities, and are likely to act 
accordingly. Several laboratory experimental studies (mainly public good experiments) 
provide evidence on pro-social behavior (for an overview, see Gächter, 2006). For example, 
Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50 percent of the subjects were conditionally 
cooperative. Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter (2003) create a laboratory situation in which each 
subject is a member of two economically identical groups, where only the group members are 
different. They observe that the same subjects contribute different amounts, depending on the 
behavior of the group. Contributions are larger when group cooperation is higher. 
Alternatively, the concept of conformity (Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain conditional 
cooperation. Conformity means that the motivation of behaving in a conditionally 
cooperative way may be influenced by the people‟s wish to fulfill the social norm of not 
being corrupt and behaving according to society‟s rules. While several early studies provide 
evidence of conditional cooperation within a laboratory setting, an increasing number of 
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studies have been conducted to check the validity of such studies outside of a laboratory 
setting using, for example, field experiments (see Frey and Meier, 2004a; 2004b; Heldt, 
2005; Shang and Croson, 2005, Martin and Randal 2005). The study of a contagion effect 
and pro-social behavior resulting from a perceived level of corruption is an area that has 
largely been ignored in the empirically oriented corruption literature, despite its potential to 
affect the level of corruption even further.  
 
2.1 Background of the Model 
Since Akerlof (1980) emphasized the persistent effect of social norms on human behavior, 
interesting approaches based on the concept social norms have been developed that help 
explain conditional cooperation in human activities. One way to accommodate such behavior 
is to allow for a guilt disutility if a citizen engages in an activity that is contradicting social 
norms. The social customs literature provides a motive for the reason why there can be a 
utility loss by the act of evading taxes (see Naylor 1989). The essence of this approach is that 
violation of social norms will bring forth moral cost. In a tax compliance framework, Gordon 
(1989) modifies the standard economics of crime model by including non-pecuniary costs of 
evasion. Non-pecuniary or psychic cost increases as evasion increases. The model he 
developed can explain why some taxpayers refuse a favorable evasion gamble. Furthermore, 
dishonesty is endogenized as reputation cost. Non-pecuniary costs have a dynamic 
component, varying inversely with the number of individuals having evaded in the previous 
period. Other researchers such as Myles and Naylor (1996) criticize this approach, stating 
that the level of evasion or non-compliance is irrelevant. Once a social custom is broken, all 
utility from it is lost. In line with this argument we will also assume that once a person breaks 
the social norm, the fact of doing so is what counts, not the magnitude of the transgression.  
We assume in our model that incorruption is regarded as a prevailing norm in societies 
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(consistent with long-held moral standards), while corruption violates this social norm. 
Corruption and therefore the violation of this social norm generates guilt or shame (Elster 
1989). The sentiments of guilt and shame may influence compliance behavior, reducing the 
perceived benefits of corruption. According to Lewis (1982), guilt arises when individuals 
realize that they have acted irresponsibly and in violation of an internalized rule or social 
norm. Since incorruption is an accepted social norm, it makes sense that individuals who 
choose to be corrupt feel guilty or ashamed. According to Spichtig and Traxler (2007), this 
internal sanction against violation will be more powerful if more individuals stick to the 
norm. In our case this means that when corruption is rare in a society, individuals tend to be 
incorrupt since the cost of violating social norm is very high. When corruption becomes more 
prevalent, more individuals become corrupt since the cost to infringe the norm declines. 
Rege (2004) stresses that a social norm for cooperation can generate conditional 
cooperative behavior since the sanction for a norm deviation will force people to stick to the 
norm. Andvig and Moene (1990) also incorporate moral cost associated with social norms 
into traditional cost-benefit analysis developed by Becker (1976), deducing multiple self-
fulfilling equilibria. The authors stress that the probability of corruption is related to its 
established frequency. On the other hand, Mishra’s (2006) model uses an evolutionary game 
framework deriving multiple evolutionary stable states in corruption level. However, many 
previous corruption models have the limitation that they only consider the behavioral 
implications in regards to bureaucrats instead of focusing on the entire society
1
. Both parties, 
bureaucrats and citizens, are players in the corruption game. Only analyzing the behavior of 
one side is not enough to explain any phenomenon related to corruption, especially in our 
context that focuses on conditional corruption. 
                                                 
1
 Mauro (2004) employed two models to analyze the behavior of bureaucrats and citizens respectively. His 
results, however, are  not convincible since he did not investigate behavior of both sides simultaneously.  
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      Social norms consist of a pattern of behaviour that must be shared by other people and 
sustained by their approval and disapproval (Elster 1989). Coleman (1990) stresses that social 
norms are rules of conduct enforced by external or internal sanction. Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000), who present a survey of the economic theory of public enforcement of law, 
emphasize the aspect of social norms for future research. Social norms can be seen as a 
general alternative to law enforcement in channeling individuals’ behavior. The violation of 
social norms has consequences like internal sanctions (guilt, remorse) or external legal and 
social sanctions as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavel (2000) state there is an 
expanding literature on social norms because of the influence social norms have on behavior, 
their role as a substitute for and supplement to formal laws and the possibility that laws 
themselves can influence social norms
2
. Fehr and Gächter (1997) define social norm as: 
“behaviour regularity that is based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave which 
triggers the enforcement of the prescribed behaviour by informal social sanctions” (p. 12).  
 
2.2 A Simple Game 
We consider a simple model of corruption. A citizen C (he) can attempt to bribe bureaucrat B 
(she) to earn an extra-legal profit . C and B have utility functions depending on (expected) 
income and the potential disutility if they engage in corruption. Let R be the income from any 
type of activity and c an index that is equal to 1 if this activity involves corruption (0 
otherwise) and  the disutility felt when engaged in corruption. The utility function is then 
given as: 
 
U(R,c)=R-c            
                                                 
2
 Posner (1997, pp. 365-366) looks at the incentives for obeying norms. He finds four: (i) norms that are self-
enforcing because obedience confers private benefits, (ii) norms that are enforced by emotions, iii) milder 
sanctions by expressions of disapproval or ridicule and (iv) internalized norms, out of a sense of guilt or shame. 
   
 
8 
 
We concentrate on a citizen’s decision whether to engage in projects that involve corruption. 
Such projects generate an additional profit of  over the best non-corrupt project. This could 
be, for example, a project that would have not received a public license according to the law 
or it may extend a project past the limits set by the law, or it may simply speed up the normal 
process. In all cases the gain  represents an additional profit over the profit earned under 
normal proceedings. If this activity does not take place, all parties involved in a potential 
corruptive activity receive a default payoff that is normalized to 0. For simplicity of 
presentation, we assume that B accepts the bribe if indifferent and C bribes if indifferent.  
Bribing and accepting a bribe incurs a cost of c for C and b for B. These costs 
represent guilt felt when engaging in bribing. Thus a low value of  represents a high 
tendency to be corrupt. Before the game starts  is drawn from a distribution function F and 
C and B draw a value of c, b; we denote by c, b respectively the random variables and 
assume that both are distributed independently according to an identical distribution function 
G. We assume that when interacting, C knows B’s guilt parameter, i.e. at least b is common 
knowledge between the two players. The timing of the game is as follows: 1. Nature draws 
, c, b; 2. C decides whether to attempt a bribe or not and if he bribes he chooses an amount 
b; 3. B decides whether to accept the bribe. Figure 2 summarizes the description of this game.  
It has a unique sub-game perfect Nash-Equilibrium in pure strategies: B accepts all bribes 
with b  b. C bribes B if   c+ b paying a bribe of b= b as this bribe is accepted by B; if  
< c+ b then C does not bribe. 
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Figure 2: Description of the Corruption Game 
 
 
Given the equilibrium the conditional probability for C to engage in corruption depends on 
his guilt parameter and the expected value of the guilt parameter of a bureaucrat, he may 
interact with: Pr( c+ b c). This probability is decreasing in E( b). If we believe that 
people tend to justify their behavior then this conditional probability will determine how 
justifiable C would judge participation in corruption or bribery. Corruption is less justifiable 
for C the higher c and the higher E( b). In this respect we observe conditional corruption – a 
low guilt cost in a society will induce even citizens with relatively high guilt cost to engage 
in corrupt activities. In the empirical section we use a large survey data set to explore this 
justifiability of corruption.   
 
Hypothesis 1:  Citizens find corruption less justifiable if they perceive their society less 
corrupt. 
  
Note, we intentionally did not discuss . In the present model  is exogenous. It may depend 
on the opportunities that open up only by bribery, hence a society with better institutions 
should allow most beneficial activities without bribes, hence  may be lower, while a society 
Citizen 
 Bureaucrat 
Bribe 
Do not bribe 
Reject Accept 
(0- c, 0)       ( -b- c, b- b) 
(0, 0) 
b 
c, b 
Nature 
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with weak institutions would have higher  as profitable activities are accessible only when 
one bribes bureaucrats.  
2.3 Dynamics 
The second issue we address is the question how a tendency towards corrupt or non-corrupt 
behaviour. To do so we assume a simple overlapping generation model with a constant 
population model. We denote by an upper index t a generation’s respective values. Each 
generation has one offspring and this offspring’s guilt parameter t+1 decreases if the parent 
was involved in an act of corruption and it increases if the parent was not involved in an act 
of corruption. We assume that on average the absolute change in the parameter in both 
directions is of the same magnitude. If this is the case then if more (less) than half of the 
population is involved in corruption the median and the average  increases (decreases) with 
the next generation:   
Pr( 2
t
)≷ 1/2  0.5
t+1
 ≶ 0.5
t
 and E(
t+1
) ≶E( t). 
Hypothesis 2  Corruption is contagious: A society experiencing a high (low) level of 
corruption will have increased (decreased) levels of corruption in the future. 
 
Again, the arguments with respect to  hold, a higher  - which may be due to weak 
institutions – will increase the spread of corruption over time. Strong institutions that allow 
all profitable activities to be undertaken legally will decrease corruption and hence over time 
will increase the guilt felt by citizens if they engage in corruption. 
 
 
2.4 Conditional Corruption – Discussion and Extensions 
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The conditionality of corruption in our model comes from the fact that low guilt costs in 
society make it more likely that a citizen engages in corruption. The proposed dynamics 
imply that this leads to lower guilt costs within a society. 
An alternative model giving rise to similar hypotheses is one where the individual’s 
guilt cost depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. In this case  
=f(Pr( 2E( ))  with f’(.)<0. In this case an equilibrium can be defined as a fixed-point of 
this function and, depending on the explicit assumption on the distribution function, could 
give rise to two or more equilibria where some are characterized by self-confirming on 
average high values of  and others by self-confirming low values of . Spichtig and Traxler 
(2007) provide a model for conditional cooperation in this spirit. 
   
  
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
3.1 Micro Analysis  
In the first stage we are going to work with survey data at the micro level to explore our first 
hypothesis. This allows us to work with a representative set of individuals, which is not often 
the case in previous (experimental) studies that have explored conditional cooperation 
primarily by using students as participants
3
. We are going to use two micro data sets. First we 
are going to work with the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, which is a European-
wide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. Next, we are going to explore the 
World Values Survey (WVS), a worldwide data set that investigates socio-cultural and 
political change. The WVS was first carried out in 1981-83, with subsequent surveys being 
carried out in 1990-93, 1995-97 and 1999-2001. 
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3.1.1 European Values Survey 
The EVS assesses the basic values and beliefs of people throughout Europe. The EVS was 
first carried out from 1981 to 1983, then in 1990 to 1991 and again in 1999 through 2001, 
with an increasing number of countries participating over time. The EVS methodological 
approach is explained in detail in the European Values Survey (1999) source book, which 
provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling procedures, the translation of 
the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of coding reliability, and data checks. 
All country surveys were carried out by experienced professional survey organizations, (with 
the exception of the one in Greece), and were performed through face-to-face interviews 
among samples of adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Tilburg University coordinated the 
project and provided the guidelines to guarantee the use of standardized information in the 
surveys and the national representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the 
questions were asked in the prescribed order. The response rate varies from one country to 
another; in general, the average response rate was around 60%.  
Because the EVS asks an identical set of questions to people in various European 
countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of conditional 
corruption. Our study considers representative national samples of at least 1000 individuals in 
each country (see Appendix Table A1).  
Our dependent variable is justifiability of corruption assessed using the following 
question:  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
3
 Fehr et al. (2003) report that the problem with using students is that they have a higher level of education and 
a higher IQ than average citizens. In addition, they often come from families with a higher than average income 
and their age range is limited.  
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Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (…) someone accepting a bribe in the 
course of their duties (1=always justified, 10= never justified). 
 
The interpretation of this question is that higher values are in line with a lower justifiability 
of corruption. This variable can be seen as a proxy for social norms of compliance (see 
Torgler 2007). We use the following question to investigate the impact of conditional 
corruption: 
  
“According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Accepting a 
bribe in the course of their duties?” (4=almost all, 1=almost none) 
 
3.1.2 World Values Survey 
We are going to work with the third WVS wave as the question referring to individual 
conditional corruption has only been asked in this wave. For the researchers who conduct and 
administer the World Values Survey (WVS) in their respective countries, it is a requirement 
that they follow the methodological requirements of the World Values Association. For 
example, surveys in the World Values Survey set are generally based on nationally 
representative samples of at least 1000 individuals of 18 years and above (although 
sometimes people under the age of 18 participate). The samples are selected using probability 
random methods, and the questions contained within the surveys generally do not deviate far 
from the original official questionnaire (for a sample of a typical World Values Survey see 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org). We have not analyzed the entire World Value Survey data set: 
countries below 750 observations have not been included in the estimations to reduce 
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possible biases due to a lack of representativeness (for an overview see Appendix Table A2)
4
. 
Furthermore, some countries do not have information on the dependent variables or some of 
the independent variables. These countries are therefore not considered.
5
.  
We use the same dependent variable as previously, namely the justifiability of 
corruption. On the other hand, we assess the relevance of conditional corruption using an 
alternative question that measures perceived corruption:  
 
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? 
Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1) 
A few public officials are engaged in it (2) 
Most public officials are engaged in it (3) 
Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4) 
 
3.1.3 Addressing the Limitations of Survey Data 
Two main limitations of survey data are often raised: a self-reporting bias and cognitive 
biases. We address these issues in turns. 
First: The validity of the justifiability of corruption variable can be criticized as it 
reports a self-reported and hypothetical choice (see Swamy et al. 2001). It can also be argued 
that an individual who has engaged in corruption in the past will tend to cover up such 
behavior by declaring a low justifiability of corruption in the survey. Furthermore, cross 
cultural comparisons should be treated with some caution. In countries where corruption is 
widespread and delays in transactions are long, additional payments to “speed up” the 
process may be justifiable and a normal part of the administration process. The necessity of 
additional payments is so pervasive in some countries that the bureaucratic mechanism does 
                                                 
4
 Thus, Montenegro and the Dominican Republic have been omitted.  
5
 Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, Turkey and Columbia. Moreover, Sweden could not be 
included as one of the control variables (education) has been coded differently.  
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not operate without them (De Soto 1989).  However Torgler and Valev (2006), show that 
survey data on corruption is highly correlated with other available proxies of corruption 
(Transparency International, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2004 (KKM) and ICRG 
(Knack, 1999)). 
 Another aspect of the self-reporting bias is that cultural differences play a role. To 
control for this we extend our study by also adding a country’s overall corruption values into 
the micro data set. We use the control of corruption variable developed by KKM due to the 
large number of countries included in this data set. The proxy measure is driven by the 
traditional notion of corruption namely “the exercise of public power for private gain” 
covering a variety of aspects ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get 
things done” to the effects on the business environment (p. 8). The values lie between –2.5 
and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to a lower level of corruption. Figure 3 illustrates 
our argument with respect to the self-reporting bias. It shows that justifiability of corruption 
is highly correlated with other more frequently used measures of corruption. 
 
<insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
Second, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that cognitive problems arise – the 
experimental literature has shown that manipulations (e.g., order of the question, wording or 
scales) can affect how people process and interpret questions. The problem is that 
“respondents may make little mental effort in answering the question, such as by not 
attempting to recall all the relevant information or by not reading through the whole list of 
alternative responses” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, p. 68). To control for such problems, we 
explore the correlation between two similar questions asked in the EVS (WVS) in different 
parts of the interview: How interested would you say you are in politics? (IP) Very interested 
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(value 1), somewhat interested (2), not very interested (3), not at all interested). How 
important is politics in your life? (INP) Very (1), (rather 2), not very (3), not at all (4). The 
correlation at the micro level is 0.614 (0.544). Moreover, we also explore the correlation with 
the following question: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss 
political matters frequently (value 3), occasionally (value 2) or never (value 1)? (DP). The 
correlation between INP and DP is 0.451 (0.533) and between IP and DP 0.564 (0.383). 
Thus, the variables are highly correlated. Face-to-face interviews may also help to guarantee 
that subjects are aware of the whole list of alternative responses. The EVS (WVS) has also 
the advantage of being a wide-ranging survey covering a large amount of different topics. 
Thus, our corruption question was only part of a larger survey, which may reduce framing 
biases.  
 
3.2 Macro Analysis 
To address our second hypothesis, the analysis will be complemented by use of a a large 
international panel macro data set: the ICRG data (see Knack 1999) covering 18 years (1986 
till 2003). We use ICRG as KKM has only been collected for a limited number of years 
(1996, 1998, 2000, 2002), and while ICRG allows us to study fewer countries, it provides 
panel data for a longer time period. The political risk rating provided by ICRG aims to assess 
the political stability of the included countries. The corruption variable is an assessment of 
corruption within the political system. The measure is concerned with actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-favors”, 
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The macro 
data set has the great advantage of being able to explore the importance of a contagion effect 
over time. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Micro Level using the EVS 
The micro analysis will allow us to explore our first hypothesis. One can argue that the 
potential conditional corruption effect could be influenced by other variables that affect 
corruption. Thus, we control in our multivariate analysis for variables such as education 
level
6
, political interest
7
, religion
8
, risk attitudes
9
, the economic situation
10
, urbanization
11
 
                                                 
6
 EVS: Formal education: At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time education, either at 
school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships. 
WVS: What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  
1. No formal education 
2. Incomplete primary school 
3. Completed primary school  
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
8. Some university-level education, without degree 
9. University-level education, with degree 
7
 EVS/WVS: How important is politics in your life? very (4), (rather 3), not very (2), not at all (1). 
8
 EVS: Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days? 
More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, 
practically never or never(8= more than once a week to 1=practically never or never).  
WVS: Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? 
More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or 
practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never). 
9
 EVS: Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which 
ones you personally think are important in a job? (15 items). Risk aversion: Good job security (1=mentioned).  
WVS: Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to you personally, most 
important if you were looking a job. Here are some of the things many people take into account in relation to 
their work. Regardless of whether you’re actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally, place first 
if you were looking for a job? 
1. A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 
2. A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 
3. Working with people you like 
4. Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment 
And what would be your second choice? 
A dummy variable was built with the value 1, if someone has chosen 2 as first or as second choice. 
10
 EVS and WVS: Here is a scale of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, 
counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your 
household falls into, after taxes and other deductions (scale from 1 to 10).. 
11
 EVS and WVS: Size of town: 
1. Under 2,000 
2. 2,000 - 5,000 
3. 5 - 10,000 
4. 10 - 20,000 
5. 20 - 50,000 
6. 50 - 100,000 
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and the employment and marital status. Previous tax compliance and corruption studies 
demonstrate the relevance of considering these factors (see, e.g., Torgler 2007, Torgler and 
Dong 2008).  
 Table 1 presents the first results obtained by working with the European Values 
Survey. In the first specification we recode the original dependent variable into a four-point 
scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the value 3 standing for “never justified”. Responses 4 through 10 were 
combined into a value 0 due to a lack of variance among them. This approach is consistent 
with previous studies (see, e.g., Torgler and Valev 2006, Torgler 2007). In the second 
specification we use the original 10-point scale. In both cases we are going to use an ordered 
probit model. The ordered probit models are relevant in such an analysis insofar as they help 
analyze the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable. The data structure indicates 
that we have a natural cut-off point. A large amount of respondents assert that corruption is 
“never justified” (71 percent of the cases). Our dependent variable therefore takes in the 
following specifications: the value 1 if the respondent says that bribing is “never justified” 
and 0 otherwise. This requires the use of a probit model in most of the specifications (see also 
Table 3). We also use weighted (ordered) probit estimations to correct the samples and thus 
to get a reflection of the national distribution. Moreover, since equations have a nonlinear 
form, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size. We therefore 
also calculate the marginal effects to find the quantitative effect of a variable on our 
dependent variable. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of individuals (or 
the probability of) belonging to a specific justifiability level, when the independent variable 
increases by one unit
12
. In all estimations the marginal effects are presented only for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
7. 100 - 500,000 
8. 500,000 and more. 
12
 Again, it should be noted that higher values are connected to a lower justifiability of corruption.  
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highest value. Furthermore, it should be noted that answers such as “don’t know” and 
missing values have been eliminated in all estimations.  
 First, we differentiate between Western and Eastern Europe as the reform process in 
the transition countries has resulted in disorientation and a heavy economic burden (Kasper 
and Streit (1999) and Gërxhani (2002)). The rapid collapse of institutional structures 
produced a vacuum in many countries that led to large social costs, especially in terms of 
worsening income inequality and poverty rates and bad institutional conditions based on 
uncertainty and high transaction costs. Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2006) report that 
governments faced difficult policy choices in this new era regarding the role of the public 
sector in general and the structure of the tax system in particular. Furthermore, Kornai (1990) 
and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000) report that citizens in many transition countries 
were not used to paying taxes at the beginning of the transition process. Thus, taxpayers may 
have reacted strongly to the tax policy changes necessary for the transition from a centrally 
controlled economy to a market economy. Moreover, rather than using a dummy variable to 
differentiate between Western and Eastern Europe, we consider also consider country fixed 
effects in specification (4). 
 Table 1 shows that the higher is the perceived corruption of other persons, the higher 
is the justifiability of corruption. The coefficient is always statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the size of the effect is substantial; if perceived corruption rises by one unit, the 
percentage of persons reporting that corruption is never justified falls between 3.8 and 5.1 
percentage points. Thus, we find support that conditional corruption matters.  
 Looking at the other variables we find support for results from previous studies in the 
literature. In line with Torgler and Dong (2008) we observe that political interest is 
negatively correlated with the justifiability of corruption. An increase in the political interest 
scale by one unit increases the probability of stating that taking bribes is never justified by 
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around 1.5 percentage points. There is also a positive correlation between education and the 
social norm of compliance. However, the effect is less strong (see, e.g., specification (4)). 
Moreover, we also observe that older people and women exhibit a higher willingness to 
comply. These results support previous findings that explored in detail a potential age
13
 and 
gender effect
14
. Married and widowed people report the lowest justifiability of corruption. 
The coefficients are statistically significant in relation to the control group (singles). On, the 
other hand, we do not observe that the employment status matters. However, religion has an 
impact on corruption. The church as an institution induces behavioral norms and moral 
constraints among their community (Torgler 2006). Religiosity seems to affect the degree of 
rule breaking. Religiosity can thus be a restriction on engaging in corrupt activities. 
Interestingly, we also observe that risk aversion matters. Risk averse people are less likely to 
justify corruption which is consistent with suggestions in the compliance literature that risk 
aversion reduces the incentive to act illegally. In our model it can be explained by 
introducing risk aversion and some uncertainty of C with respect to b.  Controlling for risk 
attitudes allows for better insights regarding the variables of age, gender, or economic 
situation. For example, it could be argued that the obtained difference between women and 
men or between different age groups is influenced by different risk attitudes functions. 
Hartog et al. (2002), e.g., conducted an empirical survey analysis and found that an increase 
in income reduces risk aversion. The estimated coefficient for the Western Europe dummy 
suggests that the institutional crisis in many transition countries in Eastern Europe after the 
collapse of communism tended to have a positive effect on citizens‟ justifiability of 
                                                 
13
 For example, Torgler and Valev (2006) investigate the willingness of being corrupt of the same cohorts over 
time (age effect) as well as and the same age groups in different time periods (cohort effect). All in all they 
observe a consistent age effect. On the other hand, a cohort effect is less obvious.  
14
 Torgler and Valev (2007) explored whether gender matters and whether a decrease of gender differences 
with greater equality of status and better opportunities affects their willingness to comply. They find evidence 
for strong gender differences. Women are significantly less likely to agree that corruption and cheating on taxes 
can be justified. The results remain robust after investigating different time periods and extending the 
specification with several opportunity factors.  
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corruption. The marginal effects indicate that being a citizen of a Western European country 
rather than an Eastern European country increases the probability of responding that 
corruption is never justified by more than 5 percentage points. Finally, we also explore 
whether urbanization matters. It has been argued that corruption may be higher in larger cities 
due to the fact that the scale of economic activities is larger and more varied in scope 
resulting in a higher level of government contacts. Moreover, government officials may be 
less personal compared to those in smaller cities which may reduce the opportunity costs of 
bribing (Mocan 2004). Table 1 shows that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 or 
10% percent level with a marginal effect of 0.3 percentage points. Thus, this relationship 
cannot be rejected although it should be noted that the effect is smaller in relation to other 
factors.  
 In the last specification in Table 1 we go beyond the original probit model (1=never 
justified) as the answer to the question might be biased by experimenter demand. It is 
obvious that the “socially correct” answer would be “never justified”. Such a concern arises if 
a large number people who think that bribing is justified were to instead claim that bribing is 
never justified. Thus, in other words, if the respondent wants to give the “socially acceptable” 
answer he would say “1” and if not he would answer truthfully. In this latter case, an answer 
of “0” might be indicative of a much higher social norm than an answer of “1”. In this case 
we would have a problem that respondents want to avoid looking bad in front of the 
interviewer (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). It would also indicate that we would observe 
systematic biases rather than just random errors. We therefore try a different cut-off point. 
We report a probit model where we convert the values 1 and 2 to 1 (all the other values = 0). 
The results in Table 1 indicate that conditional corruption matters showing similar 
quantitative effects.  
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 In Table 2 we conduct further robustness checks. We report only the findings using a 
probit model as Table 1 has shown that the probit model provides higher Pseudo R2 values. 
First, we try to better isolate a conditional cooperative effect by adding GENERALIZED 
TRUST as a variable.
15
 Specification (5) shows that the trust coefficient is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, our conditional corruption variable (SAB) remains highly 
statistically significant with a marginal effect of 5 percentage points. In a next step we add 
income
16
 as a further variable. We have added the variable sequentially in the specification 
as the number of observations decreases once you control for household income. Also here 
we observe a robust result. The variable SAB is statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
quantitative effect even increases. Income is also statistically significant with a negative sign. 
In specifications (8) to (10) we provide an interesting extension. We introduce a further 
corruption variable into the specification. However, compared to SAB, CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION measures the perceived level of corruption at the macro level
17
.  As it can 
be criticized that including an aggregated variable in a micro data set may produce downward 
biased standard errors, we provide estimations with standard errors adjusted to clustering on 
countries. Specification (8) shows that both corruption variables are statistically significant at 
the 1% level with high marginal effects. An increase in the CONTROL OF CORRUPTION 
scale by one unit increases the probability of reporting that corruption is never justified by 
6.9 percentage points. On the other hand, the marginal effect for the SAB is consistent with 
the previous findings. In specification (9) we do not include SAB to maximize the number of 
available countries in the data set as SAB has not been collected in all the countries that 
participated in the EVS
18
. In specification (10) we also neglect INCOME, to increase the 
                                                 
15
 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can‟t be too careful in your 
dealings with people? (1=most people can be trusted, 0=can‟t be too careful.). 
16
 As discussed this is a ten-point income scale from 1 to 10 (10-quantiles).  
17
 Again, higher values are in line with a lower level of corruption.  
18
 This allows to move from 15 to 30 countries.  
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number of observations. The results are robust and the marginal effects are even higher 
(between 7.3 and 8.0 percentage points).  
Causality remains an issue because one‟s own justifiability of corruption may lead to 
the expectation that others behave in the same way. However, results from strategy method 
experiments done by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) that 
carefully investigate the causality problem suggest that causality goes from beliefs about 
others‟ cheating to one‟s own behavior rather than vice versa. In our empirical work, we also 
present several two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations with different instruments and 
include several diagnostic tests to deal with the causality problem. However, we test for the 
relevance and validity of the instruments and the overidentifying restrictions. Moreover, we 
try to filter out a possible systematic bias in our conditional corruption effect by correcting 
for differences between what an individual thinks and what that individual projects on others. 
This provides a possible way of correcting parts of such a potential bias.  
 To check for robustness, we are going to use a variety of instruments in our 2SLS 
regressions reported in Table 3. In specification (11), we use an index of perceived honesty as 
an instrument for SAB
19
. In the second one, we also use GENERALIZED TRUST as an 
instrument. A seen previously, generalized trust did not affect the justifiability of corruption. 
However, as Table 3 shows generalized trust is a good instrument for conditional corruption. 
Next, we also consider a second index of perceived honesty
20
. The results indicate that the 
variable SAB remains statistically significant in all the 2SLS. Table 3 also reports the results 
of the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood-ratio test to test whether the equation is 
identified as a measure of instrument relevance. The test shows that the null hypothesis can 
                                                 
19
 Index covering the average value of the following questions: According to you, how many of your 
compatriots do the following: Claiming state benefits to which they are not entitled. Cheating on tax if they have 
the chance. Paying cash for services to avoid taxes. Speeding over the limit in built-up areas. Taking the drug 
marijuana or hash. Driving under the influence of alcohol (scale from 1 to 4).   
20
 Index covering the average value of the following questions: Speeding over the limit in built-up areas. Taking 
the drug marijuana or hash. Driving under the influence of alcohol (scale from 1 to 4).   
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be rejected, indicating that the model is identified and the instruments are relevant in all 
cases. Table 3 further shows that the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage 
regression are statistically significant in all cases. In addition, we test for the validity of the 
instruments using a Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Table 3 indicates that the null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are not correlated with the error term cannot be 
rejected. Thus, the results confirm the validity of the instruments.  
In addition, to deal with a potential causality problem, we filter out a possible bias in 
the conditional cooperative effect. Again, the causality problem may arise because an 
individual’s justifiability of bribing might lead to the expectation that others behave in the 
same way. Thus, individuals with a higher social norm of compliance have a lower 
perception that others are bribing. To deal with this possibility, we calculate first the average 
perceived corruption for each country. In the next step, we calculate the average perceived 
tax evasion in each country for individuals having the lowest justifiability of corruption. In a 
further step, we build the difference between both average values. This variable may measure 
a particular bias in perceived corruption due to the level of social norms. In a last step, we 
add this bias to the individual values of the group with the lowest justifiability of corruption 
values. As a consequence, each of the individuals with the highest social norm of compliance 
now has higher perceived corruption values. Hence, the values between the group with the 
higher and lower justifiability of corruption values are brought closer together, depending on 
the perceived corruption situation in each country. This procedure may help to better isolate 
the existence of a conditional corruption. Table 4 presents the results for the filtered 
perceived corruption variable using specifications in line with Table 1 and 2. The coefficient 
remains highly statistically significant and, although the marginal effects have (in general) 
decreased from previous estimates, they still are very high.   
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4.2 Micro Level using the WVS 
In a next step we are going to use an alternative data source to check whether the previously 
obtained results remain robust. As discussed, we are using a slightly different proxy for 
conditional corruption. The WVS provides the possibility to explore a large set of countries 
and further regions. This also provides the opportunity to explore the relevance of conditional 
corruption at the macro level. We work with average values within each country using for our 
dependent variable the 4 point scale (0 to 3). Figure A3 shows a relatively strong negative 
correlation (Pearson r=-0.424), significant at the 0.01 level. Looking at the linear relationship 
in a simple regression shows that conditional corruption can explain 18 percent of the total 
variance of the justifiability of corruption. 
In general, empirical support for a theoretical foundation depends not only on the 
validity of the theory but also on the quality of the data. It is not possible to ascertain with 
survey data whether respondents are truthful in their answers as truth is not observable by the 
interviewers (Kanazawa 2005). To validate statements one could explore the correlation 
between respondents’ statements and the CONTROL OF CORRUPTION variable at the 
macro level using country averages. Figure A3 shows an expected positive correlation 
(Pearson r=-0.381) statistically significant at the 0.05  
 Working with the WVS we are also able to control for the similar independent 
variables
21
. Table 5 presents the first results. We explore regressions with regional or country 
fixed effects. Moreover, we provide evidence with and without the income variable. In 
addition, we also include sequentially the macro corruption variable CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION. In all the specifications the variable PERCEIVED LEVEL OF 
CORRUPTION is statistically significant with marginal effects between 0.6 and 3.5 
                                                 
21
 See definition of the variables in previous footnotes.  
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percentage points. In addition, the macro variable CONTROL OF CORRUPTION is also 
statistically significant with marginal effects close to 6 percentage points. To deal with the 
social desirability problem we also change the cutoff point (see last specification in Table 1). 
The values 1 and 2 in the original scale have been coded as 1 and all other values as 0. The 
coefficient is highly statistically significant, reporting even larger marginal effects than 
comparable results in specification (20). Thus, we can conclude that conditional corruption is 
also observable when using alternative data sources. The control variables show similar 
tendencies. A higher level of political interest is correlated with a lower justifiability of 
corruption. Risk averse and married people are also less inclined to justify corruption. On the 
other hand, self-employed individuals are more likely to justify corruption. Similarly, we also 
observe an age and gender effect. However, the effects of religiosity, urbanization and 
income are less strong.  
 Table 6 presents 2SLS estimations using generalized trust as an instrument for 
perceived corruption (in line with Table 3). Looking at the first stage regressions and the 
diagnostic tests we can conclude that generalized trust is a good instrument
22
. The results also 
show that PERCEIVED CORRUPTION (PLC) remains statistically significant, providing 
therefore further support for previous findings. We report additional findings in Table 7 
obtained with a filtered PLC variable using previous specifications. Also here we observe 
that the PLC coefficient is always statistically significant with a negative sign. Thus, even 
after filtering we can conclude that conditional corruption matters.  
                                                 
22
 The WVS does not provide the possibility to consider an index of perceived honesty.  
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 In sum, after a check for endogeneity and several checks for robustness, the 
significant impact of perceived corruption remains unaffected at the micro level. Thus, 
hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. In the next stage we are going to explore the importance of 
conditional corruption at the macro level over time in order to explore hypothesis 2.  
 
 
4.3 Macro Level Using a Large Panel Data Set 
In the previous analysis we were only able to explore conditional corruption in a cross-
sectional setting. In this next step, it is highly relevant to bring in the time dimension to see 
the potential dynamics of conditional corruption. This requires the use of a panel data set. 
Therefore, we are going to work with a large international panel data set that covers 18 years 
(1986 till 2003). As discussed previously, we use the ICRG data to get a measurement of 
(perceived) corruption. The panel analysis will help us to see whether corruption is 
contagious. Sah (2005, p. 6), e.g., stresses “If past experiences have convinced some citizens 
that corruption is more pervasive in the economy, then they are more likely to cheat. Likewise, if 
their past experiences have convinced some bureaucrats that cheating is more pervasive in the 
economy, then they are more likely to choose to be corrupt…Through these dynamic 
relationships, future levels of cheating and corruption in the economy become explicitly 
linked to past levels of cheating and corruption in the economy…”. A contagion effect can 
increase the demand for corruption as individuals perceive additional opportunities for 
bribing (Goel and Nelson 2007). It can also affect the supply of corruption as potentially 
corrupt bureaucrats are aware of the high probability that one can be corrupt without being 
caught and penalized. Moreover, bureaucrats could also try to introduce lax enforcement and 
punishment strategies for corruption (Goel and Nelson 2007). Similarly, the criminal 
literature has stressed that the prevalence of a given type of criminal behavior may change the 
propensity of others to engage in that same behavior. It affects the perceptions about the net 
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return of such a behavior (information function) and also the probability of arrests or 
constraints (Ludwig and Kling 2006, Cook and Goss, 1996; Becker and Murphy, 2000; 
Manski, 1993, 2000). A contagion effect in crimes has been observed in the areas of 
assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, and serial murders (Bikhchandi, Hirshleifer and 
Welch 1998). However, only a limited number of studies have provided empirical evidence 
focusing on corruption. Evidence is mainly available from the US. Goel and Nelson (2007), 
use state-level U.S. data in a cross-sectional analysis data over the period 1995–2004, and 
find that the effect of neighboring corruption is positive and statistically significant - showing 
therefore that corruption does appear to be contagious. A 10% increase in corruption in 
neighboring states appears to increase corruption in a state somewhere in the range of 4–11%. 
Our study adds to the literature by using panel data and exploring a contagion effect at the 
international level. In line with studies on contagion in general, we are going to use lagged 
values to explore its impact
23
. To isolate such an effect we are going to control for further 
factors such as law and order
24
, democratic accountability25, economic performance, or the 
level of openness. Discretion in the application of rules enhances corruption. On the other 
hand, a strong legal system that penalizes deviance reduces the incentives to act illegally 
(high LAW AND ORDER value). In addition, a more encompassing and legitimate state 
increases the willingness to contribute. If citizens perceive that their interests (preferences) 
are properly represented in political institutions and they receive an adequate voice, their 
identification with the state increases, their willingness to be corrupt decreases (high 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY value). Moreover democratic accountability helps to 
limit the abuse of political power by selfish politicians, when citizens cannot completely 
                                                 
23
 Similarly, Becker (1996) stresses in a general framework that individual’s consumption (Ci) depends on that 
of other individuals in the past (Cjt-1) and on individual I consumption in a previous period (Cit-1).  
24
 The „law‟ sub-component measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the „order‟ sub-
component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
25
 Measures how responsive the government is with  its people.  
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foresee incumbents’ preferences, elements of direct democracy also empower them with an 
instrument for controlling the government. Levi (1988) points out that a possible method of 
creating or maintaining compliance is t provide reassurance by the government. A 
government that precommits itself with direct democratic rules imposes restraints on its own 
power and thus sends a signal that taxpayers are seen as responsible persons. Voting 
possibilities also provide utility in themselves. Citizens value the right to participate, because 
it produces a kind of procedural utility as the opportunity set increases which fosters the 
moral costs of behaving illegally and enhances rule obedience (Torgler and Schneider 2007). 
Moreover, political involvement and political attention is correlated with income as political 
attention may be a luxury good and therefore people pay more attention to corrupt activities 
and are better able to take actions against these officials (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Thus we 
would observe a negative correlation between GDP per capita and corruption. Moreover, 
economic rents will decrease with a higher level of economic competition. Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) find that corruption is higher in countries where domestic firms are protected from 
foreign competition. We use data provided by Dreher (2006) that measure three main 
dimensions of openness: economic, social and political globalization. The overall index of 
globalization covers not less than 23 variables.  
Thus, to test our second hypothesis, we propose the following baseline equations:  
 
CRit =  + 1 CTRLit + 2 CRi(t-1) + 3 LOit+ 4 DAit +  4 GLit + TDt +REGIONi + it       
(11) 
 
 
 
where i indexes the countries in the sample and t denotes the time period. CRit denotes the 
level of corruption (higher values=lower level corruption) and CRi(t-1) is the one year lag of 
corruption. LOit  is our law and order variable, DAit the proxy for democratic accountability 
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and GLit  the proxy for globalization. The regressions also contain several control variables, 
CTRLit, including  GDP per capita and the population size. We control for time as well as 
regional invariant factors including fixed time, TDt, and fixed regional effects, REGIONi
26
. it  
denotes the error term. Table 8 presents the results. We report beta or standardized regression 
coefficients to compare magnitude, which reveals the relative importance of the variables 
used. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use the 
Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. First we only include our lagged 
corruption variable. The coefficient is highly statistically significant with a high beta 
coefficient. We observe that the lagged corruption value together with time and regional 
fixed effects already explain more than 60 percent of the total variance of the variable 
corruption. In the next regression, we add our control variables together with the 
globalization index as independent variables. The results show that the coefficient for 
CORRUPTION(t-1) (CRi(t-1)) is still statistically significant at the 1% level reporting the 
highest beta coefficients among the used independent variables. Table 8 also shows that 
economic development and globalization have a negative impact on corruption.  However, it 
should be noted that this effect disappears once you control for governance/institutional 
factors in the third specification reported in Table 8. An increase in GLOBALIZATION and 
GDP per capita leads to a decrease in corruption. Moreover, a faster growing population has a 
positive effect on corruption. The third specification introduces governance and institutional 
factors. We find that both factors, LAW AND ORDER (LOit) and DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY (DAit), are statistically significant. Also here we find that the past level 
of corruption has the strongest impact, followed by institutional/governance variables and 
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 We differentiate between Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, Pacific, 
Asia, Caribbean and Australia. 
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globalization. Thus, the macro results show that corruption is not independent of the past 
experiences.  
We conduct a further robustness test to deal with a potential “social desirability” bias 
using the EVS and WVS. We run a two-stage approach where the previous estimations were 
just the first stage. First, respondents decide whether or not to answer that corruption is never 
justified (“socially correct response”). In a second stage, given the decision to answer 
something other than the socially correct response, individuals report a value from the 
remaining scale (1 to 9). The results are not reported in a table but indicate that our 
conditional corruption variable is always statistically significant.  
In sum, the micro and macro evidence generated in this paper suggests that social 
forces and past experiences matter. Conditional corruption is a key factor in understanding 
corruption.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional economics assumes that preferences are independent of the behavior of everyone 
else and also independent of past and future consumption. Therefore choices affect only the 
agents directly involved. However, in the last few decades economists have paid more 
attention to the structure of preferences. For example, social interactions, an aspect that has 
long been discussed by important figures such as Adam Smith (1759/1976), Karl Marx 
(1849), Thorstein Veblen (1899) or James Duesenberry (1949), have gained importance in 
economics. In this paper we explore whether and to what extent group dynamics or social 
forces and past experiences affect corruption. In other words, we explore theoretically and 
empirically whether conditional cooperation matters (hypothesis 1) and whether corruption is 
contagious (hypothesis 2). We use the notion of “conditional corruption” for these effects. 
The experimental economics literature has explored (pro-)social preferences through designs 
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that implement own and others’ material payoffs. We observe models of reciprocity, inequity 
aversion, or altruism in the literature (see Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni and Miller 2002). We have presented a 
theoretical framework that allows derivation of these two hypotheses. The theoretical part is 
supplemented with empirical evidence on conditional corruption and contagion. Interestingly, 
only a limited number of studies on corruption have explored this question. Similar 
discussions on social interactions can be found in the crime literature or more specifically in 
the literature on information cascades, network externalities, fads, herd behavior or 
bandwagon effects (see, e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992, 
1998, Katz and Shapiro 1985). However, as a novelty we present a large amount of empirical 
evidence that explores this question in the area of corruption. First we use two data sets at the 
micro level followed by a large international panel data set at macro level covering almost 20 
years. The results clearly indicate that the willingness to be corrupt is influenced by the 
perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro 
level also indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current 
corruption level which indicates that contagion matters. The results clearly show that 
conditional corruption matters. The findings therefore underscore the relevance of social 
interactions. The results are of particular importance in politics as genuine information is 
weak and incentives to collect information are limited due to the possibility of free-riding 
(Wintrobe 2006). When developing policy strategies it is recommended to take into account 
that individuals are not acting in isolation. Social interactions and group dynamics are highly 
relevant in the understanding of corruption. A critical mass of cooperative individuals is 
required to induce a positive dynamic process of conditional cooperation. On the other hand, 
a society which has many non-compliant individuals will inherit a weak social norm which 
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leads to a shift to a non-cooperative situation similar to a “corruption trap”. Thus, policies 
should take into account that we may observe a path-dependent process within a society
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Table 1: Impact of Conditional Corruption (EVS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
CORRUPTION (highest value 
= never justified) 
Coeff z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MODELS WEIGHTED ORDERED 
PROBIT (0-3)a 
WEIGHTED ORDERED 
PROBIT (1-10)a 
WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED PROBIT 
(9,10=1), else 0 
CONDITIONAL 
CORRUPTION 
                    
PERCEIVED SHARE OF 
COMPATRIOTS 
ACCEPTING A BRIBE  
(SAB) 
-0.133*** -8.61 -0.046 -0.142*** -9.29 -0.049 -0.110*** -6.85 -0.038 -0.151*** -8.79 -0.051 -0.184*** -9.62 -0.045 
Formal and Informal 
Education 
                    
FORMAL 0.006*** 3.07 0.002 0.007*** 3.24 0.002 0.006*** 2.95 0.002 0.004* 1.67 0.001 0.008*** 2.77 0.002 
POLITICIAL INTEREST 0.063*** 5.11 0.022 0.061*** 5.07 0.021 0.050*** 3.95 0.017 0.045*** 3.38 0.015 0.075*** 4.92 0.018 
Demographic Factors                     
AGE 30-39 0.198*** 5.85 0.066 0.194*** 5.87 0.065 0.199*** 5.55 0.066 0.224*** 5.99 0.073 0.235*** 5.84 0.053 
AGE 40-49 0.300*** 8.16 0.098 0.290*** 8.01 0.095 0.301*** 7.78 0.098 0.356*** 8.83 0.112 0.358*** 8.16 0.078 
AGE 50-59 0.342*** 8.49 0.109 0.336*** 8.56 0.108 0.342*** 8.17 0.11 0.428*** 9.79 0.13 0.426*** 8.84 0.088 
AGE 60-69 0.503*** 11.9 0.154 0.496*** 11.76 0.152 0.498*** 11.22 0.152 0.607*** 13.17 0.175 0.597*** 11.90 0.115 
AGE 70+ 0.586*** 11.37 0.171 0.567*** 11.04 0.167 0.569*** 10.43 0.167 0.707*** 12.64 0.193 0.750*** 11.59 0.130 
FEMALE 0.132*** 5.99 0.046 0.133*** 6.15 0.046 0.139*** 6.01 0.048 0.162*** 6.82 0.055 0.145*** 5.48 0.035 
Marital Status                     
MARRIED 0.128*** 4.09 0.044 0.129*** 4.2 0.045 0.147*** 4.43 0.051 0.122*** 3.51 0.041 0.097*** 2.60 0.024 
WIDOWED 0.146*** 2.78 0.049 0.148*** 2.84 0.049 0.156*** 2.8 0.052 0.105* 1.83 0.035 0.113* 1.79 0.026 
DIVORCED 0.024 0.52 0.008 0.018 0.39 0.006 0.049 1.01 0.017 0.036 0.73 0.012 0.015 0.27 0.004 
SEPARATED 0.0002 0 0.0001 -0.052 -0.52 -0.018 0.066 0.67 0.022 0.001 0.01 0 -0.108 -1.00 -0.027 
Employment Status                     
SELFEMPLOYED 0.031 0.69 0.01 0.032 0.75 0.011 0.036 0.77 0.012 -0.124** -2.51 -0.043 -0.116** -2.13 -0.030 
Risk Attitudes                    
RISK AVERSE 0.236*** 10.56 0.083 0.230*** 10.61 0.081 0.238*** 10.12 0.084 0.090*** 3.58 0.031 0.069** 2.49 0.017 
Urbanization                    
URBANIZATION -0.009** -2.09 -0.003 -0.008* -1.91 -0.003 -0.010** -2.06 -0.003 -0.009* -1.74 -0.003 -0.009* -1.69 -0.002 
Religiosity                    
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.042*** 9.45 0.015 0.042*** 9.54 0.014 0.041*** 8.7 0.014 0.013** 2.48 0.005 0.024*** 3.94 0.006 
Geographic Region                     
WESTERN EUROPE  0.168*** 7.49 0.058 0.171*** 7.82 0.059 0.162*** 6.83 0.056         
COUNTRY FIXED 
EFFECTS 
NO     NO     NO     YES     YES     
Pseudo R2 0.036    0.031    0.047    0.099    0.108    
Number of observations 18168    18168    18168    18168    18168    
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0     
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
a
 marginal effects for the highest value reported (never justified). Robust standard errors. 
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Table 2: Robustness Test and Impact of Conditional Corruption using Micro and Macro Proxies (EVS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
CORRUPTION (PROBIT) 
Coeff z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
      Clustering on countries Clustering on countries Clustering on countries 
CONDITIONAL CORRUPTION                    
SAB -0.147*** -8.39 -0.050 -0.161*** -8.56 -0.054 -0.161*** -6.65 -0.054         
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION        0.207*** 31.59 0.069 0.222*** 41.70 0.073 0.241*** 52.11 0.080 
Formal and Informal Education                
FORMAL 0.004 1.60 0.001 0.004 1.41 0.001 0.004 0.89 0.001 0.001 0.47 0.000 0.003 0.87 0.001 
POLITICIAL INTEREST 0.047*** 3.49 0.016 0.056*** 3.85 0.019 0.056*** 5.36 0.019 0.041*** 4.34 0.014 0.032*** 3.05 0.011 
Demographic Factors                
AGE 30-39 0.214*** 5.60 0.069 0.209*** 5.12 0.067 0.209*** 6.05 0.067 0.184*** 6.35 0.059 0.189*** 6.01 0.060 
AGE 40-49 0.352*** 8.57 0.110 0.357*** 8.20 0.111 0.357*** 8.74 0.111 0.274*** 7.23 0.085 0.277*** 7.99 0.086 
AGE 50-59 0.417*** 9.40 0.127 0.430*** 9.09 0.130 0.430*** 9.12 0.130 0.384*** 9.21 0.115 0.364*** 8.38 0.110 
AGE 60-69 0.611*** 13.01 0.175 0.606*** 11.98 0.172 0.606*** 10.09 0.172 0.510*** 10.71 0.147 0.513*** 10.52 0.148 
AGE 70+ 0.716*** 12.68 0.193 0.705*** 11.63 0.190 0.705*** 8.33 0.190 0.620*** 10.01 0.169 0.621*** 10.49 0.170 
FEMALE 0.162*** 6.68 0.054 0.148*** 5.70 0.049 0.148*** 7.78 0.049 0.162*** 10.05 0.054 0.176*** 12.45 0.058 
Marital Status                
MARRIED 0.121*** 3.41 0.041 0.129*** 3.37 0.043 0.129*** 3.30 0.043 0.143*** 4.67 0.047 0.136*** 5.12 0.045 
WIDOWED 0.101* 1.73 0.033 0.079 1.28 0.026 0.079 1.61 0.026 0.129*** 3.27 0.041 0.117*** 3.09 0.038 
DIVORCED 0.027 0.54 0.009 0.029 0.53 0.009 0.029 0.47 0.009 0.029 0.74 0.009 0.024 0.65 0.008 
SEPARATED 0.000 0.00 0.000 -0.044 -0.41 -0.015 -0.044 -0.58 -0.015 0.035 0.49 0.012 0.059 1.01 0.019 
Employment Status                
SELFEMPLOYED -0.128** -2.54 -0.044 -0.100* -1.78 -0.034 -0.100 -1.25 -0.034 -0.092* -1.79 -0.031 -0.115*** -2.72 -0.039 
Risk Attitudes                
RISK AVERSE 0.090*** 3.49 0.031 0.122*** 4.42 0.041 0.122*** 3.49 0.041 0.087*** 3.01 0.029 0.071*** 2.60 0.024 
Urbanization                
URBANIZATION -0.008 -1.55 -0.003 -0.001 -0.27 0.000 -0.001 -0.20 0.000 -0.010* -1.72 -0.003 -0.012** -2.27 -0.004 
Religiosity                
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.014** 2.50 0.005 0.015** 2.53 0.005 0.015** 1.98 0.005 0.011* 1.91 0.003 0.011** 2.06 0.004 
Trust                
GENERALIZED TRUST -0.024 -0.90 -0.008 -0.025 -0.89 -0.008 -0.025 -0.78 -0.008 -0.019 -0.78 -0.006 -0.024 -1.01 -0.008 
Economic Situation                 
INCOME     -0.021*** -3.65 -0.007 -0.021** -2.40 -0.007 -0.012 -1.58 -0.004    
Geographic Region                    
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES     YES     YES     YES     YES     
Pseudo R2 0.100    0.107    0.107    0.104    0.098    
Number of observations 17537    15395    15395    28989    34475    
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 3: 2SLS Results (EVS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
CORRUPTION 
Coeff 
 
(11) 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
 
(12) 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
 
(13) 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
 
(14) 
t-Stat. 
    
CONDITIONAL 
CORRUPTION 
        
PERCEIVED SHARE OF 
COMPATRIOTS ACCEPTING 
A BRIBE (SAB) 
-0.093*** -6.87 -0.091*** -6.63 -0.094*** -6.58 -0.036** -2.24 
Formal and Informal Education         
FORMAL 0.001 1.18 0.001 1.12 0.001 0.78 0.001 1.49 
POLITICIAL INTEREST 0.014*** 3.24 0.014*** 3.25 0.017*** 3.73 0.018*** 3.95 
Demographic Factors         
AGE 30-39 0.064*** 4.81 0.060*** 4.37 0.058*** 4.03 0.062*** 4.40 
AGE 40-49 0.110*** 7.81 0.107*** 7.51 0.107*** 7.17 0.114*** 7.91 
AGE 50-59 0.121*** 7.97 0.115*** 7.49 0.120*** 7.42 0.128*** 8.28 
AGE 60-69 0.178*** 11.56 0.177*** 11.41 0.174*** 10.46 0.183*** 11.53 
AGE 70+ 0.199*** 10.98 0.198*** 10.89 0.192*** 9.88 0.206*** 11.13 
FEMALE 0.055*** 6.87 0.056*** 6.81 0.050*** 5.83 0.050*** 6.01 
Marital Status         
MARRIED 0.053*** 4.25 0.053*** 4.23 0.059*** 4.35 0.052*** 3.95 
WIDOWED 0.042** 2.23 0.042** 2.18 0.040** 1.98 0.037* 1.92 
DIVORCED 0.030* 1.67 0.030 1.64 0.034* 1.78 0.017 0.91 
SEPARATED 0.025 0.71 0.026 0.71 0.018 0.48 -0.002 -0.06 
Employment Status         
SELFEMPLOYED -0.037** -2.31 -0.037** -2.27 -0.027 -1.53 -0.032* -1.90 
Risk Attitudes         
RISK AVERSE 0.036*** 4.02 0.038*** 4.17 0.050*** 5.07 0.047*** 4.95 
Urbanization         
URBANIZATION -0.003 -1.64 -0.003 -1.52 -0.001 -0.35 -0.002 -0.95 
Religiosity         
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.006*** 3.46 0.006*** 3.48 0.006*** 3.31 0.006*** 3.33 
Economic Situation         
INCOME     -0.006*** -3.01 -0.006*** -3.25 
Geographic Region         
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES   YES   YES   YES   
First stage regressions:         
Index of Perceived Honesty I 0.735*** 52.91 0.733*** 51.63 0.734*** 48.67   
Index of Perceived Honesty II       0.542*** 38.89 
Generalized Trust    -0.054*** -4.54 -0.058*** -4.57 -0.068*** -5.30 
F-Test of excluded instruments 2799***  1364***  1214***  784***  
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood 
ratio stat. 
3481***  3388***  2991***  2105***  
Anderson-Rubin test 47.60***  47.05***  45.96***  5.44*  
Hansen J statistic   1.801  1.591  0.357  
Number of observations 15755  15248  13331  14281  
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. 
The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 4: Causality Discussion (Filtering)  
WEIGHTED        
PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
DEPEND. V.: JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION 
(highest value = never justified)    Effects 
INDEPENDENT V. (see specifications)       
Specification (15)     
Filtered SAB using specification (4) -0.090*** -5.21 -0.030 
      
Specification (16)     
Filtered SAB using specification (5) -0.086*** -4.89 -0.029 
      
Specification (17)     
Filtered SAB using specification (6) -0.100*** -5.33 -0.034 
      
Specification (18)     
Filtered SAB using specification (7) -0.100*** -5.25 -0.034 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION  0.212*** 32.32 0.071 
        
Notes: Summary of four regressions. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, 
SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors.  
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Table 5: Conditional Corruption using WVS 
WEIGHTED PROBIT 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
CORRUPTION 
Coeff 
 
(19) 
z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. 
 
(20) 
z-
Stat. 
Marg. Coeff. 
 
(21) 
z-
Stat. 
Marg. Coeff. 
 
(22) 
z-
Stat. 
Marg. Coeff. 
 
(23) 
z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. 
 
(24) 
z-
Stat. 
Marg. 
     Change of cutoff point 
CONDITIONAL 
CORRUPTION 
                       
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF 
CORRUPTION (PLC) 
-0.112*** -11.90 -0.035 -0.020* -1.81 -0.006 -0.034*** -2.81 -0.010 -0.035** -2.50 -0.011 -0.043*** -2.95 -0.013 -0.041*** -3.35 -0.009 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION           0.187*** 15.18 0.059 0.185*** 14.09 0.058    
Formal and Informal 
Education 
                  
POLITICIAL INTEREST 0.025*** 3.02 0.008 0.031*** 3.55 0.010 0.021** 2.17 0.006 0.036*** 3.15 0.011 0.030** 2.52 0.009 0.051*** 5.18 0.011 
FORMAL -0.002 -0.64 -0.001 0.003 0.77 0.001 0.006 1.25 0.002 0.005 0.95 0.002 0.010* 1.75 0.003 0.006 1.34 0.001 
Demographic Factors                   
AGE 30-49 0.204*** 9.91 0.064 0.195*** 9.20 0.059 0.194*** 8.51 0.059 0.177*** 6.52 0.055 0.183*** 6.43 0.057 0.193*** 8.36 0.043 
AGE 50-64 0.406*** 15.37 0.117 0.395*** 14.46 0.111 0.399*** 13.50 0.111 0.380*** 10.83 0.109 0.375*** 10.23 0.107 0.392*** 12.87 0.077 
AGE 65+ 0.572*** 16.11 0.151 0.532*** 14.45 0.138 0.526*** 13.04 0.136 0.549*** 11.50 0.144 0.531*** 10.71 0.140 0.534*** 12.55 0.094 
FEMALE 0.141*** 8.89 0.045 0.141*** 8.67 0.044 0.132*** 7.40 0.041 0.161*** 7.58 0.051 0.152*** 6.83 0.048 0.156*** 8.61 0.035 
Marital Status                   
MARRIED 0.103*** 4.99 0.033 0.122*** 5.67 0.038 0.136*** 5.81 0.042 0.129*** 4.64 0.041 0.133*** 4.53 0.042 0.126*** 5.35 0.029 
WIDOWED 0.086** 2.18 0.026 0.084** 2.01 0.025 0.092** 2.04 0.028 0.095* 1.87 0.029 0.072 1.36 0.022 0.098** 2.08 0.021 
DIVORCED 0.020 0.48 0.006 -0.001 -0.02 0.000 0.029 0.64 0.009 0.026 0.49 0.008 0.024 0.43 0.007 -0.0001 0.00 0.000 
SEPARATED 0.069 1.22 0.021 0.015 0.26 0.005 0.008 0.14 0.003 0.066 0.87 0.020 0.054 0.69 0.017 -0.0002 0.00 0.000 
Employment Status                   
SELFEMPLOYED -0.078*** -2.64 -0.025 -0.088*** -2.87 -0.028 -0.102*** -3.09 -0.032 -0.098*** -2.65 -0.032 -0.106*** -2.70 -0.034 -0.087** -2.59 -0.020 
Risk Attitudes                   
RISK AVERSE 0.084*** 4.95 0.026 0.071*** 4.03 0.022 0.068*** 3.49 0.021 0.080*** 3.43 0.025 0.075*** 3.07 0.023 0.073*** 3.70 0.016 
Urbanization                   
URBANIZATION 0.001 0.40 0.000 -0.008** -2.30 -0.002 -0.007* -1.80 -0.002 -0.010** -2.40 -0.003 -0.008* -1.77 -0.002 -0.005 -1.23 -0.001 
Religiosity                   
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.0002 0.04 0.0001 0.018*** 3.86 0.006 0.017*** 3.40 0.005 -0.003 -0.58 -0.001 -0.005 -0.86 -0.002 0.021*** 4.02 0.005 
Economic Situation                     
INCOME        -0.006 -1.42 -0.002    -0.011** -2.48 -0.004    
REGIONAL FIXED EFFECTS YES    NO    NO   YES    YES    NO     
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS NO     YES     YES     NO     NO     YES     
Pseudo R2 0.038    0.082    0.107    0.059    0.058    0.099    
Number of observations 37759    37759    32096    20793    18914    37759    
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 6: 2SLS Results (WVS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
CORRUPTION 
Coeff t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
  
(25)  (265)  
CONDITIONAL CORRUPTION       
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION (PLC) -0.044** -2.43 -0.061*** -3.04 
Formal and Informal Education     
POLITICIAL INTEREST 0.007** 2.35 0.003 0.84 
FORMAL -0.001 -0.94 0.000 -0.29 
Demographic Factors     
AGE 30-49 0.067*** 9.32 0.066*** 8.53 
AGE 50-64 0.127*** 14.96 0.129*** 14.19 
AGE 65+ 0.170*** 16.23 0.171*** 14.87 
FEMALE 0.045*** 8.85 0.042*** 7.66 
Marital Status     
MARRIED 0.039*** 5.27 0.042*** 5.28 
WIDOWED 0.032*** 2.83 0.040*** 3.35 
DIVORCED 0.012 0.89 0.027* 1.94 
SEPARATED 0.031* 1.67 0.033* 1.68 
Employment Status     
SELFEMPLOYED -0.024** -2.43 -0.031*** -2.94 
Risk Attitudes     
RISK AVERSE 0.027*** 5.14 0.022*** 3.79 
Urbanization     
URBANIZATION 0.001 0.81 0.001 0.91 
Religiosity     
CHURCH ATTENDANCE -0.0002 -0.15 -0.002 -1.16 
Economic Situation      
INCOME    0.0004 0.34 
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES   YES   
First stage regressions:       
Generalized Trust  -0.302*** -28.14 -0.297*** -25.68 
F-Test of excluded instruments 791.73***   659.46***   
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio stat. 956.497***   810.495***   
Anderson-Rubin test 5.88**   9.20***   
Number of observations 36296   30968   
Prob > F  0.000   0.000   
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 7: Causality Discussion Filtering with WVS Data  
WEIGHTED        
PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
DEPEND. V.: JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION 
(highest value = never justified)    Effects 
INDEPENDENT V. (see specifications)       
Specification (27)     
Filtered PLC using specification (19) -0.129*** -12.87 -0.041 
      
Specification (28)     
Filtered PLC using specification (20) -0.020* -1.75 -0.006 
      
Specification (29)     
Filtered PLC using specification (21) -0.026** -2.08 -0.008 
      
Specification (30)     
Filtered PLC using specification (22) -0.035** -2.50 -0.011 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION  0.187*** 15.18 0.059 
      
Specification (31)     
Filtered PLC using specification (23) -0.043*** -2.95 -0.013 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION  0.185*** 14.09 0.058 
Notes: Summary of four regressions. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, 
SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors.  
 
Table 8: Contagion Effect at the Macro Level 
Dependent Variable: Corruption (higher values = lower level of corruption)   
 
Beta 
(32) 
t-stat. 
 
Beta 
(33) 
t-stat. 
 
Beta 
(4) 
t-stat. 
 
Corruption (t-1) 0.599*** 19.80 0.548*** 15.17 0.461*** 12.78 
       
Rule of Law     0.204*** 7.85 
       
Democratic Accountability     0.180*** 7.52 
       
Log (GDP per capita)   0.112*** 3.39 -0.048 -1.46 
       
Log(population)   -0.042*** -2.68 -0.056*** -3.98 
       
Globalization Index   0.220*** 3.13 0.191*** 3.08 
       
Region Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  
R
2
 0.666  0.710  0.754  
# of observations 1439  1059  1059  
Notes: Estimations with robust standard errors. OLS coefficients = standardized/beta coefficients. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Countries in the EVS Sample (30 countries) 
Western European Countries Eastern European Countries 
Germany  Belarus 
Austria Bulgaria 
Belgium Croatia 
Great Britain Czech Republic 
Denmark Estonia 
Finland Greece 
France Hungary 
Iceland Latvia 
Ireland Lithuania 
Italy Poland 
Malta Romania 
Netherlands Russia 
North Ireland Slovak Republic  
Portugal Ukraine 
Spain  
Sweden  
 
 
Table A2: Countries in the WVSSample (34 countries) 
countries 
  
Armenia  Moldova  
Australia  Nigeria.  
Azerbaijan  Norway  
Bangladesh  Peru  
Belarus  Philippines  
Bosnia-Hercegovina Russia  
Brazil  Serbia  
Bulgaria  Slovenia  
Chile  Spain  
Croatia  Switzerland  
Estonia  Taiwan  
Finland  Ukraine  
India  Uruguay  
Latvia  USA  
Lithuania  Venezuela  
Macedonia  Western Germany
a
  
Mexico Eastern Germany
a
 
Notes: 
a 
The data allows differentiation between East and 
West Germany.  
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Figure 1: Correlation between Justifiability of Corruption and Perceived Corruption  
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Note: Pearson r = - 0.424. More countries than in the regression analysis.  
 
 
Figure 3: Correlation between Justifiability of Corruption and Control of Corruption  
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Note: Pearson r= 0.381. More countries than in the regression analysis.  
 
